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LIBYA-EGYPT

President Qadhafi's newest diplomatic and propaganda offensive against President Sadat will add to Egypt's problems in formulating a joint Arab negotiating policy. Qadhafi is putting heavy pressure on Arab and Islamic leaders to denounce publicly Sadat's recent statements concerning recognition of Israel and the possibility that Israeli cargoes will be permitted to transit the Suez Canal.

According to the Libyan press, Qadhafi has so far received messages from Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, North Yemen, and Bahrain disavowing Sadat's remarks. Syrian President Asad is quoted as stating, "Syria has not and will not consider recognition of the Zionist enemy, which is not the right of any chief of state or leadership."

Qadhafi hopes that a general Arab condemnation of Egypt's recent moves will isolate Sadat and undercut Egypt's credibility as spokesman for the Arabs during the next round of negotiations with Israel. Libya probably also wants to harden Arab negotiating positions as they prepare for the Arab summit that will probably take place later this summer.

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Qadhafi's activity is being accompanied by virulent new attacks on Sadat by the Libyan media; some contain scarcely veiled calls for the Egyptian leader's assassination. Over the weekend, the Libyans staged anti-Sadat demonstrations that were the largest since the peoples' march on Cairo in 1973. Nearly 10,000 demonstrators—including many resident Egyptian workers—participated in a rally in Tripoli.

Such actions are bound to draw a sharp reaction from Cairo and may once again bring Libyan-Egyptian relations close to the breaking point. So far, Sadat has been the sole target of Libyan ire; however, Qadhafi may use festivities to be held today in celebration of the US evacuation from former Wheelus air base as the occasion for lashing out at Washington.

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GREECE

Under Greece's new constitution, which comes into force today, parliament must elect a new president of the republic by August 10, but there is speculation in Athens that the election will take place before the end of June.

Prime Minister Karamanlis has not indicated whether he will be the candidate. There is increasing speculation that he may choose to stay on as prime minister and name a trusted confidant as the presidential candidate. Election of the candidate of Karamanlis' choice is assured because of his party's dominance of parliament.

The opposition, which has 84 seats in the 300-member parliament, has been unhappy over its inability to amend some of the key provisions of the constitution concerning presidential powers. It walked out of the constitutional debate two weeks ago and boycotted the final vote on the constitution. Karamanlis' party strongly backed the constitution; 208 New Democracy deputies voted for it and 7 of 8 absentees sent telegrams indicating their approval.

The opposition maintains that the powers accorded the president are excessive and had proposed that the president be elected by the people, instead of by parliament. Both George Mavros, leader of the Center Union - New Forces, and Andreas Papandreou of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement have stated they will continue to work for further amendment of the constitution.

Under the constitution, future presidents will have the right to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and dissolve parliament. Parliament can override a presidential veto only by a three-fifths majority. The constitution also provides that deputies elected from one party cannot change their party affiliation during their parliamentary term without being considered as having resigned. The latter provision reflects Karamanlis' disenchantment with deputies crossing party lines and should go a long way toward preventing the fragmentation that has characterized previous Greek parliaments.

If Karamanlis opts to remain as prime minister for the time being, this decision is likely to reflect, at least in part, his fear that competition and controversy over the choice of a successor as prime minister might create open rebellion and possibly a split in his heterogeneous New Democracy Party. New Democracy is an amalgam of competing factions and interest groups, and the danger of a split between a conservative right wing and a more progressive faction—or some other variation—has always been a possibility.

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The constitution creates a strong presidency, however, and appears to have been tailor-made for Karamanlis. Should Karamanlis opt to remain as prime minister for now, it would probably be with the idea that he would move up to the presidency.

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ITALY

Christian Democratic leaders are setting aside their differences as Italy enters the final week of the election campaign.

Influential party leaders such as Prime Minister Moro and Foreign Minister Rumor seem to have swallowed their misgivings about party chieftain Fanfani's tough tactics. Late last week, Moro spoke of his solidarity with the party secretary, and for the first time joined Fanfani in taking the Socialists to task for running joint lists with the Communists in many localities.

Even the leaders of leftist factions in the Christian Democratic Party are spreading the party line, although their criticism of the Socialists is softer.

Still, party leaders seem to be looking to different points in the future. Fanfani is riveted on getting out the largest Christian Democratic vote possible, at whatever the cost later. Rumor and Moro seem more concerned about picking up the pieces after the election, when the center-left parties will probably have to resume their collaboration on the national level.

The issue of joint Socialist-Communist election lists is likely to remain controversial. The Socialists claim there is nothing new about this practice and were caught off guard by statistics released by Fanfani last Friday. Fanfani claims these lists have increased 69 percent in smaller towns and have doubled in larger towns since 1970.

Few Italians are willing to predict the outcome of the elections, but many seem to expect moderate losses by the Christian Democrats.

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NORTH KOREA - SOUTH KOREA

North Korea has taken steps in recent days to restrict the dialogue with the South.

Pyongyang has unilaterally postponed until July further meetings of the North-South Coordination Committee, as well as the North-South Red Cross talks. In both instances, Pyongyang cited the militant anti-communist atmosphere being fanned by the Pak government in Seoul as the reason for the postponements.

The North-South contacts have produced little beyond increasingly harsh propaganda exchanges since early 1973, when the exploratory dialogue of the 1971-72 period faltered because of mutual North-South suspicions. Neither Pyongyang nor Seoul, however, has wanted to bear the onus of a complete break.

North Korea's current motives are probably tactical; in the past, Pyongyang has postponed North-South contacts to protest specific issues. The current delays give Pyongyang another opportunity to press its line that the Pak regime, backed by the US, is responsible for the heightened tensions in Korea and that real progress in the dialogue is not possible until Pak and US forces go. Pyongyang will hit this theme hard at the UN General Assembly session this fall.

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